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ABSTRACT 
 
The theory of tariffs is very different from the reality of tariffs. Most of the literature on 
protectionism is too theoretical and, more importantly, too aggregate. In practice, tariffs greatly 
differ among products and affect consumers differently based on their income and gender. In this 
paper we use a gender approach to study US tariffs on selected apparel and footwear products. 
The scope of this study is to examine whether gender plays a role in evaluating the cost of tariffs 
on consumers and to suggest policies to end a possible discriminatory conduct. 
 
 
1.  INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF THE LITERATURE  
 
he discussion on tariffs has been very animated in academia and media over the last decade. The 
main shortcoming of this discussion is that is too theoretical and, more importantly, too aggregate. In 
practice tariffs greatly differ among products and consumers are affected differently based on their 
income and gender. In a previous study we have shown that the current US tariff system on apparel and footwear 
appears to be ineffective as a tool of protectionism and act as a regressive taxation upon the poor, Andrejevic et. al. 
(2006). In this paper we extend our investigation by using a gender approach to study tariffs on selected apparel and 
footwear products and to suggest policies to end a possible discriminatory conduct.   
 
As we have discussed in our previous study Andrejevic et. al (2006), the standard analysis of tariffs 
analyzes their effects by using the consumer and producer surplus. The basic result is that tariffs redistribute income 
from domestic consumers who pay a higher price for the commodity to domestic producers who receive the higher 
price and the government who collects revenue from tariffs. This leads to inefficiency that is referred as the 
protection or deadweight loss of the tariff. In this type of analysis the emphasis is on the inefficiency of the system 
and the calculation of the welfare effects. Consumers are taken as a whole, without distinguishing between low and 
high income consumers and consequently this type of literature does not address the redistributive effect of tariffs 
among consumers. The only exceptions to this approach are the contributions of Gresser (2002a, b) and Andrejevic 
et. al (2006) which distinguish between different types of consumers and different types of products. A more serious 
shortcoming of the literature on protectionism is the lack of reference to gender with the exception of a limited 
discussion in the media, Barbaro (2007). In this paper we try to address this shortcoming by extending our previous 
analysis on apparel and footwear to understand the role of gender.  
 
The paper is constructed as follows. Section one provides an introduction and summary of the literature, 
section two deals with the tariff system in apparel and footwear, section three studies tariffs in footwear and apparel 
by using a gender approach. Section four provides policy recommendations and finally section five summarizes the 
main conclusions. 
 
2.  THE TARIFF SYSTEM IN APPAREL AND FOOTWEAR 
 
Since the 1960 tariffs on industrial products have been dramatically reduced. In 2002, the average ad 
valorem tariff on all goods was 1.6 % Gresser (2002a). However, this overall average does not show the actual 
pattern of tariffs. Particularly, tariffs on natural resources (oil, metal ores) and farm products (coffee and chocolate) 
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are usually zero or minimal; tariffs on high-tech consumer goods (computers, airplanes, and medical equipment) 
have been progressively eliminated while tariffs on low technology consumer products (apparel and footwear) still 
remain extremely high. Thus, authors such as Gresser (2002a) claim that the US has a two tariff system, one for low-
tech consumer goods with an average rate of 10.5% and the other (for everything else) with an average rate of 0.8%. 
In this paper we focus our attention on footwear and apparel where the average tariff is 11.4% and generated total 
tariff revenue of 46.7%.  
 
As we have shown in our previous study Andrejevic et. al (2006) the above average tariff on apparel and 
footwear was not able to protect either employment or output. The reduction in employment on both sectors is 
striking similar: -66% in footwear and -65% in apparel between 1995 and 2004. Turning to output, the data show a 
negative trend in both sectors. However, the reduction in output in footwear is much more pronounced: -89.9% 
between 1995 and 2003 versus -60.05% in apparel between 1997 and 2004. Needless to say, these results can be 
explained with the competition coming from Asian countries where costs, particularly labor cost, are much lower. 
 
Moreover, tariffs on apparel and footwear hit low income consumers, since they spend a disproportionate 
percentage of their income on necessities, Andrejevic et. al (2006) and Grasser (2002a). In addition to income, there 
is a gender issue concerning the tariffs on apparel and footwear which, as stated above, has not been properly 
addressed and needs further investigation.  
  
3.  A GENDER APPROACH TO APPAREL AND FOOTWEAR TARIFFS 
 
The main question addressed in this section is: Is there a gender difference in the U.S. tariff system for 
apparel and footwear and how can it be explained? Before answering this question, one preliminary point needs to 
be clarified. Our investigation is at product level and we compare products disaggregated by gender. The 
disaggregation of these products is mainly based of their final use, as well as the material employed to produce 
them.  
 
Table 1 summarizes the main results of our empirical investigation
1
. As one can see from the table, the 
main results are the following two.  
 
1) Gender difference in tariffs plays a role at product level. In the case of footwear there is a limited pattern of 
divergence of 1.5 percentage points with the only exception of golf shoes. In the case of apparel the gender 
divergence, however, is greater and can reach extremely high figures: 16 percentage points in the case of 
swimwear followed by 15.6 and 13.3 percentage points for suits of various synthetic fiber compositions. It 
is worth adding that in the case of footwear, women are penalized whereas in the three apparel cases, men 
are. 
2) Out of the twenty two products examined, sixteen of them exhibit higher tariff rates for women. In very 
simplistic way we can interpret this result by saying that there is a discrimination against women. However, 
a full account of the gender discrimination at aggregate level should consider not only the number of 
products but also the amount of the divergence in the tariff as well as the value of the products. 
 
Turning to the question of the rationality behind the gender discrimination, there are several interpretations. 
The more simplistic one is “plain old sexism”, Barbaro (2007) since the first appearance of gender differences in the 
tariff system dates back to the mid 1800s. The second most common interpretation is based on the belief that the 
system is irrational. This position is even supported by the U.S. government. The only opinion of federal regulators 
on this issue appeared in a 1960 study of the U.S. tariff system in which, discussing the gender disparities on shoes, 
they claim that “their economic justification is questionable” Barbaro (2007). 
 
                                                 
1 The table had been constructed as follows: In the case of footwear and leather products, we only reported those products with a 
gender difference in tariff equal or greater than 1.4, while in the case of apparel, we reported only those products with gender 
difference equal or higher than 3.4. The products have been listed in ranking order according to the difference in tariff by gender 
(in absolute terms). 
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Our interpretation is different. We think that the maintenance of the above average tariff in apparel and 
footwear as well as the gender differences are the results of an interaction between the powerful industrial lobby in 
Washington
2
 which tries to eliminates the competition, and the government who tries to maximize its revenue. The 
evidence for the government revenue maximization can be drawn by combining the figures of table 1 and table 2. As 
one can see, table 2 assembles the data for imports for the twenty two products selected in table 1. Combining the 
figures of the two tables, one can see that there is a positive correlation between tariffs and import at gender level. In 
particular, for a specific gender, the higher is the import of a particular product relative to the other gender, the 
higher will be the tariff for that gender. We found that this is the case for fourteen products out of nineteen, (since no 
data are available for three products). The gender divergence between the import values of a particular product can 
be striking. For example, in the case of swimwear, the import for men is approximately $124 million, while that for 
women is approximately $14 million. Needles to say, the government’s revenue is maximized if the tariff for men is 
much higher. An alternative way of analyzing this problem will be to look at the correlation between tariffs and the 
price elasticity of demand for each product selected. However, this alternative approach requires additional 
investigation given the extreme level of disaggregation of the data. 
 
 
Table 1: Tariffs (Ad Valorem) on selected apparel and footwear products (2006) 
 
Apparel Knitted and Crocheted 
Product Women and Girls Men and Boys Difference 
Suits of synthetic fiber (>23% of wool and fine animal hair) Free 15.6% - 15.6 
Suits of other synthetic fiber 14.9% 28.2% - 13.3 
Jackets and Blazers of artificial fibers 24% 14.9% 9.1 
Overcoats of other man-made fiber (>23% of wool and fine 
animal hair) 
18.8% 10% 8.8 
Suits of artificial fiber (>23% of wool and fine animal hair) 8.5% Free 8.5 
Jackets and Blazers of synthetic fiber (>23% of wool and fine 
animal hair) 
16.5% 10% 6.5 
Jackets and Blazers of wool and fine animal hair 16% 10% 6.0 
Apparel Not Knitted and Crocheted 
Swimwear of man-fiber 11.8% 27.8% - 16.0 
Suits of other artificial fiber 25.9% 14.9% 11.0 
Shirts of silk or silk waste 6.9% 1.1% 5.8 
Anoraks, Padded and Sleeveless Jackets of wool and fine 
animal hair 
14% 8.5% 5.5 
Underwear of cotton 11.2% 6.1% 5.1 
Bib and Brace Overalls of artificial fiber 13.6% 8.5% 4.9 
Underwear of man-made fiber and other materials  14.9% 10.5% 4.4 
Suits of artificial fiber (>36% of wool and fine animal hair) 17% 21% - 4.0 
Other Anoraks  16.3% 19.3% - 3.4 
Footwear 
Golf Shoes  10% 5% 5.0 
Footwear with outer soles of rubber, plastic, leather and uppers 
of leather 
10% 8.5% 1.5 
Other Footwear made on a base or platform of wood 10% 8.5% 1.5 
Sport Shoes (tennis, basketball, gym) 10% 8.5% 1.5 
Parts of Footwear of leather or composition leather 10% 8.5% 1.5 
Articles of Leather 
Leather Gloves other than horsehide and cowhide lined and not 
lined 
12.6% 14% - 1.4 
Source: United States Harmonized Tariff Schedule 
 
 
 
                                                 
2 On this issue see Andrejevic et. al. 2006. 
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Table 2: Imports (value in thousands US dollars) on selected apparel and footwear products (2006) 
 
Apparel Knitted and Crocheted 
Product Women and Girls Men and Boys Difference 
Suits of synthetic fiber (>23% of wool and fine animal hair) 240 N/A N/A 
Suits of other synthetic fiber 1,1229 N/A N/A 
Jackets and Blazers of artificial fibers 10180 237 9,943 
Overcoats of other man-made fiber (>23% of wool and fine 
animal hair) 
4,216 610 3,606 
Suits of artificial fiber (>23% of wool and fine animal hair) 44 N/A N/A 
Jackets and Blazers of synthetic fiber (>23% of wool and fine 
animal hair) 
4,251 110 4,141 
Jackets and Blazers of wool and fine animal hair 18,663 1,318 17,345 
Apparel Not Knitted and Crocheted 
Swimwear of man-fiber 14,727 124,867 - 110,140 
Suits of other artificial fiber 22,755 4,089 18,666 
Shirts of silk or silk waste 345,799 147,175 198,624 
Anoraks, Padded and Sleeveless Jackets of wool and fine 
animal hair 
414 577 - 163 
Underwear of cotton 725 226,064 - 225,339 
Bib and Brace Overalls of artificial fiber 235 139 96 
Underwear of man-made fiber and other materials  11,144 10,277 867 
Suits of artificial fiber (>36% of wool and fine animal hair) 1,099 317 782 
Other Anoraks  42,481 44,994 - 2,513 
Footwear 
Golf Shoes  18,594 73 18,521 
Footwear with outer soles of rubber, plastic, leather and uppers 
of leather 
94,981 36,087 58,894 
Other Footwear made on a base or platform of wood 603,983 253,036 350,947 
Sport Shoes (tennis, basketball, gym) 916,075 1,098,591 - 182,516 
Parts of Footwear of leather or composition leather 126 4,171 - 4,045 
Articles of Leather 
Leather Gloves other than horsehide and cowhide lined and not 
lined 
10,268 85,092 - 74,824 
Source: US International Trade Commission 
 
 
4.  POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
As mentioned in the introduction, the important issue of gender discrimination in the U.S. tariff system did 
not receive any attention in academic circles and very little attention in the media with the only exemption of 
Barbaro (2007). This is not the case in the business world. At the moment, few major apparel makers like Asics, 
Columbia Sportswear and Steve Madden are challenging the tariff system in lawsuits against the federal 
government. Their claim is that the different tariff rates for similar products based on gender represent a violation of 
the Constitution guarantee of due process and equal protection of the law. Hence, the tariff differentials constitute de 
jure gender discrimination
3
.  
 
If the apparel makers win the case, the government will be obliged to pay one billion dollars as a 
compensation for tariff discrimination. For example, the lawsuit claims that in 2006 the government earned $2.5 
million from discriminatory tariffs on underpants (penalizing women); $16 million on silk shirts (penalizing women) 
and $71 million on shoes with leather tops (penalizing women) Barbaro (2007). The companies claim to charge 
equal price for similar men and women products. Consequently a discriminatory tariff represents a serious loss of 
money for the business community.  
                                                 
3 Additional empirical evidence shows that tariffs on apparel and footwear for babies and infants do not differentiate between 
genders. 
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The next problem here is the policy response of the federal government to the potential loss of the court 
case. Is the government going to eliminate gender differences by raising the lower tariffs or by reducing the higher 
ones? It is obvious that a conflict exists between the government’s interest in raising the tariffs to maximize the 
revenue, and the companies’ interest in lowering tariffs to maximize profits. Perhaps, this dilemma can be resolved 
by bringing the consumer into the picture which allows a more comprehensive approach. In our previous 
investigation, we found that tariffs on apparel and footwear act as a regressive taxation upon the poor because tariffs 
hit low income consumers which spend a disproportional percentage of their income on these products. People with 
the highest income i.e. $100,000 (4.1% of total population) spend 4.3% of their income on apparel and footwear, 
while the people with lowest level of income i.e. up to $9,999 (9% of the total population) spend 5.1% of their 
income on these products. Among the latter group, if we also consider those with income equal and less than $5,000 
the consumption of apparel and footwear goes up to 5.5%. In other words, the poorer the person, the higher the 
proportion of his/her income spent on apparel and footwear, Andrejevic et. al (2006). Hence, this consideration 
brings an additional type of discrimination incorporated in the U.S. Tariff System: income discrimination. 
 
Based on these two types of discrimination, the government should eliminate the gender differences in 
tariff, but also reduce their levels. There is no justification for gender difference of 16 percentage points for 
swimwear, as well as no justification for a low income consumer paying an ad valorem tariff of 32% on manmade 
fiber t-shirt when the average ad valorem tariff on all goods is 1.6%.  
 
5.  CONCLUSIONS 
 
In this paper we used a gender approach to study U.S. tariffs on selected apparel and footwear products. 
The scope of this paper was to examine whether gender played a role in evaluating the cost of tariffs on consumer 
and to suggest policies to end a possible discriminatory conduct. The main conclusions of the paper can be 
summarized as follows.  
 
 Gender plays a role in the tariff system. In the case of footwear there is a limited pattern of divergence 
while in apparel, the gender difference is much higher and can reach extremely high figures.  
 Out of the twenty two products examined, sixteen of them exhibit higher tariff for women indicating 
possible gender discrimination.  
 The gender difference in tariff allows the government to maximize its revenue since the empirical evidence 
shows a positive correlation between tariffs and imports at gender level.  
 Our policy recommendation for the government is not only to eliminate the gender divergence in the tariff, 
but also to lower their levels because in addition to the gender discrimination, there is an income 
discrimination incorporated in the U.S. Tariff System that needs to be addressed.  
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